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Abstract
Organ donation after cardiac or circulatory death (DCD) has been introduced to increase the
supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, we argue that the recovery of viable organs useful for
transplantation in DCD is not compatible with the dead donor rule and we explain the
consequential ethical and legal ramifications. We also outline serious deficiencies in the current
consent process for DCD with respect to disclosure of necessary elements for voluntary informed
decision making and respect for the donor's autonomy. We compare two alternative proposals for
increasing organ donation consent in society: presumed consent and mandated choice. We
conclude that proceeding with the recovery of transplantable organs from decedents requires a
paradigm change in the ethics of organ donation. The paradigm change to ensure the legitimacy of
DCD practice must include: (1) societal agreement on abandonment of the dead donor rule, (2)
legislative revisions reflecting abandonment of the dead donor rule, and (3) requirement of
mandated choice to facilitate individual participation in organ donation and to ensure that decisions
to participate are made in compliance with the societal values of respect for autonomy and self-
determination.
Background
Medical and pharmacologic advancements have made it
possible to transplant organs successfully and thereby to
save the lives of many persons who otherwise would die
from irreversible end-stage organ disease. The greatly
enhanced technical ability to transplant organs has also
led to an ever-increasing need for transplantable organs
[1]. The explosive growth in the demand for and the mar-
ginal increase in the supply of transplantable organs have
together been characterized as an 'evolving national
health care crisis' [2]. In fact, organ donation rates nation-
ally have changed little in the past 15 years [3], whereas
the need for donated organs has grown 5 times faster than
the number of available cadaveric organs [4]. It is there-
fore no surprise that the transplantation community and
society as a whole now consider balancing the demand for
and the supply of transplantable organs as one of their
biggest challenges.
The continually increasing need for organs led to the
reintroduction of the principle of donation after cardiac
or circulatory death (DCD) in the early 1990s with the
Pittsburgh protocol to complement already available
organ procurement from brain-dead persons [5,6]. A new
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federal mandate requires hospitals as of January 2007 to
design policies and procedures for organ procurement in
DCD to increase the rate of organ donation and recovery
from decedents to 75% or greater [7-9].
However, DCD is controversial because of medical, ethi-
cal, and legal uncertainties about the premise that donors
are indeed dead before their organs are procured [10-13].
In this article, we contend that the recovery of viable
organs useful for transplantation in DCD is not compati-
ble with the dead donor rule and we explain the ethical
and legal ramifications of DCD. We also examine the cur-
rent process of consent for organ donation and whether it
includes the necessary elements for voluntary informed
consent (i.e., the full disclosure of information relevant to
decision making and respect for the person's autonomy).
We will contrast the ethical aspects of two alternative pro-
posals for increasing donation consent in society: pre-
sumed consent and mandated choice. Finally, we will
conclude by positing that in order for the current principle
of DCD to proceed with recovery of transplantable organs
from decedents, a paradigm change in the ethics of organ
donation is necessary. The paradigm change to ensure the
legitimacy of DCD practice must include (1) societal
agreement on abandonment of the dead donor rule, (2)
legislative revisions reflecting abandonment of the dead
donor rule, and (3) the requirement of mandated choice
to facilitate individual participation in organ donation
and to ensure that DCD is in compliance with the societal
values of respect for autonomy and self-determination.
DCD and the dead donor rule
The criteria for determining death play a prominent role
in the acceptability of DCD. The recovery of viable organs
for successful transplantation must be achieved with the
donor already dead at the time of procurement in order to
comply with the dead donor rule. Whereas some have
considered a person dead after 2 minutes of apnea, unre-
sponsiveness, and absent arterial pulse [5], the Institute of
Medicine recommended waiting for 5 minutes of absent
consciousness, respiration, and mechanical pump func-
tion of the heart (zero pulse pressure through arterial cath-
eter monitoring), irrespective of the presence of electric
activity of the heart (evident on electrocardiographic
monitoring) [14]. In 2001, the American College as well
as the Society of Critical Care Medicine concluded in a
position statement that a waiting period of either 2 min-
utes or 5 minutes was physiologically and ethically equiv-
alent and therefore either was an acceptable timeline for
beginning the process of organ retrieval [15]. Waiting for
longer than 5 minutes can cause warm ischemia and det-
rimentally affect the quality of procured organs and
impair their suitability for transplantation. However, crit-
ics have argued more than a decade ago that the waiting
time to determine death by respiratory and circulatory cri-
teria is based on insufficient scientific evidence [10]. The
spontaneous return of circulation and respiration (i.e., the
Lazarus phenomenon or autoresuscitation) has been
reported to occur in humans as long as 10 minutes after
cessation of circulation and respiration. Autoresuscitation
appears to validate previous concerns that viable organs
may be procured from persons who are in the process of
dying yet are not truly dead [16-18].
According to the Uniform Determination of Death Act
(UDDA) of 1981, a person is determined dead after hav-
ing sustained either irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all
brain function, including that of the brain stem, and the
determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards [19]. The President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research defined the statute
for the determination of death so that ""Death is a Single
Phenomenon" [20]. The statute is intended to address the
question "how, given medical advances in cardiopulmo-
nary support, can the evidence that death has occurred be
obtained and recognized". The President's Commission
defined the cessation of circulation to be irreversible for
death determination " [i]f deprived of blood flow for at
least 10–15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem,
will completely cease functioning". A 4–6 minute loss of
blood flow – caused by, for example, cardiac arrest – typ-
ically damages the cerebral cortex permanently, while the
relatively more resistant brainstem may continue to func-
tion."
The challenge in determining death for organ procure-
ment is twofold: (1) the use of an arbitrary set of criteria
and time frames to define irreversible cessation of circula-
tory and respiratory functions without evidence of the
uniformity for death determination and (2) the variability
of the criteria used by different institutions for organ pro-
curement protocols [14,21].
The notion of irreversibility of cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions has been a contentious medical and
ethical issue. Tomlinson proposed a definition of irrevers-
ibility as "a requirement that arises only at the level of the
criteria for the determination of death, rather than at the
level of the concept of death, just as 'beyond reasonable
doubt' is not a part of the concept of 'guilty', but instead is
a requirement for the legitimate determination of guilt
within a judicial system." [22]. The requirement for irre-
versibility therefore depends on the context in which, and
the purposes for which, the concept of death is being used
[22]. The notion of irreversibility is commonly under-
stood as meaning either that the heart cannot be restarted
spontaneously (a weaker construal) or that the heart can-
not be restarted despite standard cardiopulmonary resus-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/8
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citation (a stronger construal). The stronger construal of
irreversibility as meaning "can never be reversed" implies
in its extreme that at no time can organ procurement ever
be permissible because future possibilities of resuscitation
can never be fully ruled out. In practical terms, the weaker
definition of "not reversible now" implies that a person is
considered irreversibly dead based on that person's moral
choice to forego resuscitative interventions; thus, as long
as the probability of autoresuscitation is negligible, the
dead donor rule is not violated. On the basis of that argu-
ment, the notion of irreversibility depends on the person's
choice to forego resuscitative interventions after sponta-
neous cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.
However, the argument that irreversibility can be under-
stood as a moral choice is flawed. First, the issue is not
whether there are good reasons not to resuscitate a person
but whether the person is truly dead [18]. Second, resusci-
tative interventions are performed during the procure-
ment process to keep organs viable for transplantation
after the cessation of vital functions. The use of artificial
cardiopulmonary bypass machines, external mechanical
cardiac compression devices, and reinflation of the lungs
to preserve organs for procurement also results in the
resuscitation of the heart and the brain after the formal
declaration of death. Resuscitation of the brain with a
return of consciousness is particularly problematic
because the Institute of Medicine announced in its 2006
report that expansion of the organ donor pool by procur-
ing organs from living persons with normal brain func-
tion who sustain sudden cardiac death is morally
acceptable [23].
Longer than 10 minutes of absent circulation is required
for irreversible cessation of the entire human brain,
including brain stem function. The administration of
medications to suppress heart and brain functions is
therefore required when the procurement process begins
within 5 minutes of cessation of circulation [12,24].
The use of resuscitative methods and medications to sup-
press heart and brain functions during organ procurement
raises a host of additional ethical and legal questions.
Organ donors consent to the withholding of all resuscita-
tive interventions after cessation of circulatory and respi-
ratory functions through a do-not-resuscitate (DNR)
directive. Under such conditions, the use of resuscitative
methods for organ procurement violates not only the
dead donor rule but also the person's health directives.
The strong probability of a return of heart and brain func-
tions during procurement also means that the act of organ
removal is the immediate and proximate cause of death
for that person.
The need for criteria to sharpen "the indeterminate
boundary between life and death" for death determina-
tion has been widely recognized [25]. The dependence on
both circulatory and respiratory criteria only for the deter-
mination of death in DCD is problematic and conceptu-
ally inconsistent because of (1) there is a likelihood of
spontaneous reversibility of circulatory and respiratory
functions when organ procurement begins, and (2) the
possibility for the brain to recover function long after cir-
culatory arrest, particularly when artificial circulation is
used for organ procurement. Therefore, the practice of
DCD conflates a prognosis of death with a diagnosis of
death [12,26]. The application of criteria for irreversible
cessation of neurologic, circulatory and respiratory func-
tions requires a waiting time well in excess of 10 minutes
to sharpen the determination of death for organ procure-
ment [27-32]. However, that waiting time can also make
it more difficult to recover viable organs for transplanta-
tion. The simultaneous determination of total cessation of
the activity of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is
required for the determination of death when respiration
and circulation are artificially supported during organ
procurement. Capron and Kass emphasized in the Presi-
dent's Commission when defining death "A person will
be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a phy-
sician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
he has experienced an irreversible cessation of respiratory
and circulatory functions, or in the event that artificial
means of support preclude a determination that these
functions have ceased, he has experienced an irreversible
cessation of total brain functions"[20].
The dead donor rule and the law
DCD has been recommended on the basis of the utilitar-
ian rationale of maximizing the number of organ trans-
plants in order to save more lives. This utilitarian
approach has also provided implicit justification for
manipulation of some aspects of the death process [33].
Intervention has been justified not only in the dying proc-
ess but also in defining the word dead. The uncertainty of
the uniformity of determination of death in DCD has
legal implications [34]. The act of procurement or the
removal of organs from persons who may still be in the
process of dying but who are labeled as being dead,
becomes the direct and proximate cause of death or of
"killing" rather than the natural illness itself [35]. Medi-
cally redefining death arbitrarily to permit DCD for organ
procurement has been a necessary prerequisite for the cir-
cumvention of homicide law. Declaration of death or call-
ing someone dead takes the burden off procurement
personnel and provides the appearance that it is accepta-
ble to remove organs under such conditions without
being found guilty of murder [36]. The purposeful manip-
ulation of the criteria for the determination of death
serves the desired goal of increasing the opportunities for
procurement of transplantable organs, but it also repre-
sents a knowing gerrymandering of the existing legal defi-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/8
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nition [34]. The President's Commission indicated in the
1981 report on defining death that the UDDA is intended
to aid in the process of recognition and providing a legal
standard to distinguish the dead from the dying and,
ought not to reinforce the misimpression that there are
different "kinds" of death, defined for different purposes,
and hence that some people are more "dead" than oth-
ers[20]. An argument can be made that a person's consent
or permission for organ donation can legitimize this inter-
vention, as with any other medical procedure with poten-
tial risk of death. However, that argument transgresses the
legal limits of autonomy, because no person can consent
to his or her own killing. The ban on assisted suicide,
regardless of a person's wishes, reaffirms that society has a
consolidated interest in preserving life. In the United
States (U.S.), physician-assisted suicide is legalized only
in the State of Oregon.
Problems with consent for organ donation
Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) are the desig-
nated requesters for organ donation [37,38]. Hospitals are
required to notify OPOs of all imminent deaths before
withdrawal of ventilator support to allow OPO represent-
atives to initiate independent discussion of consent for
organ donation with surrogates [7,39]. The OPOs are pri-
vate organizations under government contract with Medi-
care and Medicaid Services to coordinate deceased organ
procurement [7]. Each OPO has significant financial
incentives for maximizing organs recovery through con-
sent for donation from hospitals located within the dona-
tion service area. The Organ Donation Breakthrough
Collaborative has set three top-level goals for each OPO to
achieve: 1) a 75% or higher organ donation (or conver-
sion) rate from regional hospitals, 2) 3.75 (or greater)
organs transplanted per organ donor and 3) DCD to
account for 10% (or greater) of donation service area's
deceased donors, without a decrease in brain dead donors
[37]. The successful compliance with the set goals are
required for each OPO to maintain active certification and
renewal of contract with Medicare for payment for services
provided in a donation service area [7]. Additional finan-
cial incentives for the OPO to aggressively purse organ
donation in Medicare approved hospitals include reim-
bursement for actual donors, financial returns on local
transplant activity solely supported by local donor activity
and Medicare incentives for local organ donation activity
[40].
Obtaining consent is considered one of the guiding prin-
ciples that provide moral validation of organ transplant
programs. Consent for organ donation can be registered
and documented in several ways. The donor registry is an
online electronic database for accessing donor consent
information and it is readily available to OPO personnel.
In contrast, donor consent documented on driver's
licenses, donor cards, or advanced directives may not be
available to clinicians when donation or procurement
decisions must be made [41]. Consent for organ donation
is obtained in two different situations. The first situation
is to acquire consent from healthy persons for future
organ donation. It is generally achieved by inviting mem-
bers of the public to complete donor cards (e.g., as part of
a driver's license application) providing general consent
for organ donation or to consent to organ donation by
signing up on a state registry when they visit an OPO Web
site [42]. The second situation occurs when consent is
obtained from a surrogate decision maker for a brain-
dead person or a person for whom death is imminent and
who has not expressed intent for organ donation through
a driver's license, a donor card or donor registry.
Studies show that half of the families who are asked to
consider donation after a relative's death refuse consent
[43]. It should therefore come as no surprise that in addi-
tion to educating the public, the Institute of Medicine
Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation has
identified among its primary objectives an increase in the
number of opportunities for people to record the decision
to donate and the enhancement of donor registries to
ensure full access to and sharing of donor registration data
[23].
Requiring consent is consistent with one of the corner-
stones of medicine and bioethics: respect for individual
autonomy. Among other things, the process of obtaining
consent must include the provision of an appropriate
quantity and quality of information so that the person can
make an informed decision. Currently, the consent for
DCD is requested with disclosure of similar information
as with brain-death donation. Given the medical and eth-
ical uncertainties surrounding DCD, its consent process
should be expected to be different from that used in brain-
death donation. The differences between the two types of
organ donation with regard to timing and the nature of
the procurement procedure, nonbeneficial interventions,
and trade-offs in end-of-life care are not often clarified to
potential donors or surrogate decision makers at the time
of consent [44]. DCD also exposes donors to the risk of
failing to die within the allotted time frame for successful
organ procurement after the performance of predonation
procedures [45].
Considering that actual donation or procurement proc-
esses differ according to the death criteria, one might
expect the consent process to include details about the
various death scenarios. In 2006, Woien et al examined
the quality and quantity of information about consent
that is disclosed to the public and to potential organ
donors on OPO Web sites [44]. The information content
about relevant aspects of medical interventions, proce-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/8
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dures, protocols and changes to the quality of end-of-life
care was found to be deficient because it was focused pri-
marily on the encouragement and reinforcement of con-
sent to donation [44]. This lack of disclosure on OPO
Web sites and in online consent documentation raises
doubts about whether organ donors actually receive and
understand the pertinent information necessary to mak-
ing an informed decision about whether to participate in
deceased organ donation. The lack of detailed and accu-
rate disclosure violates the tenet of informed consent and
abuses the public's trust in the deceased organ donation
system.
The medical community is expected to be transparent and
to fully inform the public about the different donation
practices and their implications. Yet, disclosing more
detailed information about organ donation to the general
public may very well result in a decrease in donor registra-
tions [46]. Suggestions that the organ supply shortage is a
health care crisis may also have a detrimental effect by
exacerbating public fears and by fueling excessive worry or
speculation that procurement decisions may ultimately go
beyond socially accepted thresholds. The Institute of Med-
icine has proposed changes in the consent format as a way
to increase the organ donation rate in the community
while also reducing the risk of increased public fear [23].
The explicit or express consent of competent adults or sur-
rogate decision makers is the current standard for organ
donation consent. Other consent options include the pre-
sumed consent, conscription (sometimes referred to as
routine removal) or mandated choice.
Presumed consent
Presumed consent means either implied consent inferred
from other actions or tacit consent that constitutes con-
sent in the absence of explicit dissent [47,48]. Presumed
consent within the context of organ donation implies a
default position of donation for those persons who do not
take action to dissent (opting out). The switch from
explicit  consent to implicit  presumed consent has been
advocated as an efficient method to increase the supply of
transplantable organs.
The ethical justification commonly given for a switch to
presumed consent is twofold. First, polls show that about
69% of Americans are "very likely" or "somewhat likely"
to grant permission to have their organs harvested after
death, [43] which suggests broad public support. How-
ever, there has always been a gap between people's per-
ceived attitudes in polls on organ donation and what they
do in practice. Perhaps this is not simply a refection of
knowledge but of personal experiences and beliefs [49].
Also in a subsequent national survey of organ and tissue
donation attitudes and behaviors (conducted by the Gal-
lup Organization and prepared for the Division of Trans-
plantation Health resources and Services Administration),
most people either "opposed" (26.7%) or "strongly
opposed" (30.1%) presumed consent [50]. In the same
survey, about 3 in 10 reported that they would opt-out of
a presumed consent approach. Second, as some have
argued, deceased organ donation should be considered a
duty rather than an act of charity [51]. Hester postulated
that "deciding not to release our organs for transplanta-
tion would constitute a serious moral wrong" in light of
the desperate need for transplantable organs [52].
Presumed consent certainly poses a challenge to the prin-
ciple of protecting a person's right to fully informed agree-
ment (consent), and its moral justification therefore falls
short. First, the issue of a moral obligation to donate
organs at death is still subject to debate; a public discourse
on this topic has not yet taken place. Second, access to
health care including organ transplantation services is not
universal. Data released in August 2006 by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau showed that more than 46.8 million people
are uninsured and 24.4% of those earned less than
$25,000, an unknown number of people had limited
health care coverage, and 12.6% of the U.S. population
lived below the poverty margin [53]. As the erosion of
employer-based health insurance continues, the numbers
of underinsured and uninsured persons are likely to
increase. In addition, 82% of kidney recipients are white
which leads one to speculate that there may be racial dis-
crepancy in organ allocation [54]. Third, the duties of rel-
evant stakeholders in health care remain poorly defined.
The question of who is responsible for what in health care
has yet to be answered, which is even more troubling in
light of the fact that health care in the 21st century is more
commonly understood solely in terms of a commodity
operating in a self-regulating free-market environment.
How complex social interactions are to be arranged is a
subject of rational discourse for which every participant
should assume responsibility and be held accountable
[55].
Widespread public education and clear, easy and transpar-
ent ways for persons to register dissent are requirements
for an ethically acceptable presumed consent policy [23].
Considering that the current process of donation consent
is deficient in its provision of basic information about
organ donation and that there is an absence of established
social practices that would warrant the presumption of
consent for organ donation, the justification is lacking for
a switch from express to presumed consent in the United
States.
Conscription, also referred to as mandatory donation, is
the routine postmortem removal of organs for transplan-
tation. As such, it presupposes society's right of access to
the organs of any deceased person. Such a right would restPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/8
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either on the claim that society "owns" the body of the
deceased or on the premise of an enforceable moral duty
all of us as humans have to allow postmortem organ
retrieval. In the U.S., the government does not claim com-
plete authority over the disposition of the bodies of the
deceased [23]. Some states in the U.S. have even inter-
preted the right of a person or family to decide whether to
donate organs as an interest sufficient to endow some
rights to the corpse that cannot be disregarded without
due process. Such laws have assigned a property interest in
the body to the next of kin [56]. Conscription would
depart from this legal principle as well as from the norm
of expressed consent.
Although the routine removal of organs after death is
inconsistent with current U.S. federal and state laws, some
proponents postulate the appropriateness of conscription
on practical and ethical grounds. Practical arguments
include the fact that people with organ failure are dying
daily because of the short supply of transplantable organs
and that many usable organs are never made available,
most commonly because of family refusal. Conscription
would override family refusal for donation and produce
an efficient rate of deceased organ recovery almost close to
100% [57]. Conscription would eliminate the need for
costly public education programs, training of requesters,
and maintenance of donor registries; it might also allevi-
ate concern about abuse or possible commodification of
the human body. The duty-based justification for con-
scription fails, however, because organ transplantation
practices are inconsistent with the requirement of univer-
sality. Not everyone is included in a fair system that is
mutually beneficial. Conscription would maximize organ
recovery but would do so to the detriment of respect for
personal autonomy and accepted societal norms. It would
also violate the religious values of some persons for the
body to not be buried whole [58].
Mandated choice
The second consent option is that of mandated choice.
Mandated choice would require all adult persons in the
community to consider organ donation and to document
their decision. All competent adults would be required to
decide in advance to agree to organ donation or to refuse
organ donation, and their wishes would be considered
legally binding (unless they had a documented change of
mind before actually dying). Mandated choice would pre-
serve altruism and the voluntary nature of donation, and
as such proponents consider it to be consistent with the
principle of respect for autonomy [59]. Opponents of
mandated choice postulate that it is unacceptable in a lib-
ertarian society to force people to make choices [60] and
that mandated choice is coercive and an intrusion on pri-
vacy [61]. Concerns have also been raised that mandated
choice would disallow consideration of the views of the
family [62].
With the current view of the shortage of transplantable
organs identified by many people as a health care crisis,
one might argue that neither a mandate to make an auton-
omous prospective decision about organ donation nor
the expectation of a family's compliance with the wishes
of the deceased is unreasonable. A similar justification can
be made about the intrusion of privacy associated with
mandated choice [63]. However, mandated choice would
require full disclosure of relevant unbiased information
about all aspects of organ procurement that, in turn, con-
stitutes informed consent. The importance of public edu-
cation in mandated choice is illustrated by the failure of a
state initiative in Texas. In 1991, Texas enacted a law
requiring citizens to make a "yes" or "no" choice about
organ donation when they renewed their driver's license.
The law had to be repealed in 1997 because the imple-
mentation of the mandatory choice resulted in a refusal
rate of 80% [64]. This high rate of refusal was attributed
to the lack of public education about organ donation [65].
It is therefore of great concern that OPOs today have
focused their efforts on convincing members of the public
to become organ donors rather than on providing ade-
quate unbiased information and education about organ
donation. A 2006 report from the Institute of Medicine
suggested that optimal public education would be cost
prohibitive and labor intensive [23].
Paradigm transformation of organ donation 
ethics
There is growing doubt among scholars and medical prac-
titioners that DCD can comply with the principles on
which it was introduced into society as an ethically accept-
able practice. We have highlighted several concerns indi-
cating that the current DCD practice not only violates the
dead donor rule but also puts the moral legitimacy of con-
sent for donation in question. Unless the current DCD
practice is reevaluated, the erosion of public trust and
damage to the integrity of the medical profession are
likely to develop over time. To avoid these negative conse-
quences, we are faced with implementing any or all of
three strategic options. The first strategy would be to dis-
continue DCD and instead focus on reducing the demand
for transplantable organs by promoting healthy lifestyles
(i.e., primary and secondary prevention programs for
chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension)
[66,67]. This strategy might decrease the future incidence
of end-stage organ disease and the resulting need for
transplantation; however, it would not resolve the current
imbalance between the supply of and the demand for
organs. The second strategy would be to revise the uni-
form definition of death to allow the definition of "dead"
to be applied to dying persons so that the recovery ofPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2007, 2:8 http://www.peh-med.com/content/2/1/8
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transplantable organs from DCD can be continued in an
ethical and legal manner [36]. Bernat, for instance, has
argued for a change in the standard determination of
death that would substitute "permanence" for "irreversi-
bility" and thereby permit the classification of dying per-
sons as truly dead [68]. Bernat's proposal to change the
death determination implicitly acknowledges that the cur-
rent DCD practice is inconsistent with the dead donor
rule. Bernat justifies violation of the dead donor rule and
there is no need to distinguish between the "dying" and
the "dead" for the purpose of organ procurement for
transplantation. The justification put forward by Bernat
conflicts with the President's Commission views on when
and how the death statute is applied "to distinguish the
dead from the dying" and to prevent "the mistaken
impression that a special "definition" of death needs to be
applied to organ transplantation, which is not the case"
and that it "ought not to reinforce the misimpression that
there are different "kinds" of death, defined for different
purposes, and hence that some people are [more dead]
than others" [20].
The word "permanence" conveys the absolute accuracy of
the "prognosis" rather than a determination or diagnosis
of death. However, opponents of the criterion of absolute
certainty of prognosis of death may consider as homicide
its application to persons for whom the consent to with-
draw artificial life support is made [69]. Revising the
UDDA in this manner would have far-reaching ethical
implications not only for society but also for criminal and
homicide laws. Criminal prosecution, inheritance, taxa-
tion, treatment of cadaver, and mourning are all affected
by the way society draws the dividing line between life
and death [20]. More importantly, it can violate the prin-
ciple of nonmaleficence by allowing the introduction of
errors in prognostication that may have a detrimental
effect on end-of-life care and palliation. The third strategy
would be to abandon the dead donor rule for organ pro-
curement so that procuring organs becomes permissible
during the terminally ill person's dying phase after volun-
tary informed consent has been obtained [26]. The aban-
donment of the dead donor rule would constitute a
paradigm switch in the ethics of deceased organ procure-
ment for transplantation from donor beneficence to
autonomy and nonmaleficence. Donors would be solely
responsible for their decisions, and the medical commu-
nity would have to comply with the do-no-harm principle
at the end of life. As is the case with revising the determi-
nation of death, this paradigm switch would require
changes in criminal and homicide laws to legitimize DCD
legally, ethically, and medically. In addition, changing the
paradigm would require public discourse about permit-
ting autonomy-based end-of-life decisions. The preserva-
tion of a person's autonomy and the voluntary nature of
the decision are fundamental for such a profound para-
digm shift and, as such, they require comprehensive pub-
lic education and disclosure of all relevant information.
The mandated personal choice in conjunction with the
paradigm shift would protect an individual's right to agree
or refuse and thereby would eliminate coercion in the
organ donation consent process with minimal infringe-
ment on privacy. Within this context, mandated choice
restores the public trust and eliminates the individual's
fear of manipulation of the dying and death process for
the intent of organ procurement. Mandated choice is com-
patible with the principle of respect for individual auton-
omy and decision making, and it does not require
additional consent from a person's family to procure
organs after death.
Conclusion
The long-term solution for overcoming the shortage of
transplantable organs is to focus on, and to broadly
implement, universally accessible preventive health-care
programs. For the short term, increasing the number of
potential donors while also maintaining the public trust
and the integrity of medicine requires public education, a
consent process characterized by full disclosure of rele-
vant information about organ donation and procurement
procedures critical to the decision making about organ
donation, and a switch of the ethics paradigm from benef-
icence to nonmaleficence and respect for individual
autonomy to allow for DCD to comply with legal and eth-
ical standards. The implementation of mandated choice
for obtaining consent would appear reasonable and mor-
ally justifiable to assist with the objective of increasing the
number of people who consent to organ donation after
death. Ultimately, the outcome of public debate must be
the decisive factor in determining the conditions under
which DCD should be considered legitimate.
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